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Abstract. At present, the cloud storage used in searchable symmetric encryption schemes (SSE) is
provided in a private way, which cannot be seen as a true cloud. Moreover, the cloud server is thought
to be credible, because it always returns the search result to the user, even they are not correct. In order
to really resist this malicious adversary and accelerate the usage of the data, it is necessary to store the
data on a public chain, which can be seen as a decentralized system. As the increasing amount of the
data, the search problem becomes more and more intractable, because there does not exist any effective
solution at present.
In this paper, we begin by pointing out the importance of storing the data in a public chain. We then
innovatively construct a model of SSE using blockchain(SSE-using-BC) and give its security definition
to ensure the privacy of the data and improve the search efficiency. According to the size of data, we con-
sider two different cases and propose two corresponding schemes. Lastly, the security and performance
analyses show that our scheme is feasible and secure.
Keywords: Searchable Encryption, Transaction, BlockChain, Cloud-Storage, Symmetric Encryption, Pri-
vacy.
1 Introduction
The cloud storage can allow users with limited physical resources to get access to their own data at any
devices, and it only charges a few fee, therefore, more and more people prefer to upload their data onto the
cloud. However, if the data are not processed before storage, the confidentiality and privacy of data cannot
be guaranteed effectively. One feasible solution is to encrypt them by using a regular encryption algorithm
before uploading. When the users want to retrieve the segments of the data, they download all the data and
filter out that they need. However, if the number of data that contain keyword w is large, this method is
unpractical. To address this issue, Song et al. firstly proposed Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) term
[36].
SSE aims to solve the search problem on ciphertexts. In this model, it usually involves three parties: Data
owner, server and user. The data owner encrypts his n documents D = {D1, D2, . . . , Dn} into ciphertexts
C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}. In order to improve the search efficiency, an auxiliary information, called as Index
I, is generated. Then the data owner sends I and C to the server. The server can use the search token
t(w) received from the user to compute the pointers to the documents that the user needs, and returns the
corresponding documents to the user. At last, the user uses the private key to decrypt them locally.
In fact, in order to reduce the space complexity, Song’s scheme [36] did not employ the index structure,
so the search complexity is linear in the length of the document. However, they pointed that to improve the
search efficiency, it is feasible to reduce the level of security properly. That is to say, a SSE scheme is secure
as long as it meets the following demands:
1. The server cannot learn anything about the plain documents when it only gets the ciphertexts;
2. When the server executes search algorithm, it also cannot learn anything about the plain documents and
the plain keywords querying except the search results.
Undoubtedly, a stronger privacy guarantee about SSE can be achieved by using the oblivious RAMs [21]
or the private information retrieval (PIR) technology [23]. But they need multiple interactions between the
server and the user, which are unpractical.
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The cloud storage used above is provided privately. Though it can guarantee the privacy and the security
of data, it limits the usage of data. For example, a medical researcher wants to observe the symptoms of
the patients infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) to further provide a possible treatment.
Therefore, he needs to get access to a large of electronic medical records (EMRs) from different clouds.
However, the researcher usually chooses the clouds with low service charges, which may affect the experiment
results. For another example, because the clouds do not share their data to each other, the doctors cannot
make more effective treatment based on the previous diagnostic results from another hospital. Although cloud
storage provides convenience to users, it allows the cloud storage provider to spend more money and energy
to maintain these data. Therefore, this cloud storage device cannot be called a real cloud.
Moreover, the server in SSE usually is credible, who always returns the result to the user, even if the result
is not correct. That is to say, if the server is a malicious adversary, he may return a wrong result to the user.
Though it can utilize the message authentication codes (MAC) technology to resist such adversary, there is a
precondition: The server must return something to the user. Therefore, this adversary cannot be called as a
malicious adversary. There does not exist any effective solutions to resist a real malicious adversary. However,
we can find an alternative: If the server returns wrong results, it cannot charge the service fee. The user can
choose someone else to help it to search.
1.1 Related Work
Though Song et al. [36] pointed out that it can introduce some auxiliary information to improve the search
efficiency, they did not provide a solution. Goh et al. firstly used Bloom Filter to construct an Index for each
document [20]. They thought a SSE scheme was secure if it was indistinguishability against chosen keyword
attacks (IND-CKA). However, this definition was valid only when the users performed all the searches at
once. In addition, it did not require the trapdoor to be secure, which caused the Index unsafe. Therefore,
Curtmola et al.[18] redefined the security definition and gave two feasible schemes with O(D(w)) complexity,
where D(w) denotes the number of the documents that contain keyword w. This is the first solution to
achieve sub-linear complexity.
Alderman et al. presented a SSE scheme supporting multi-level access policy [1]. The Index was different
from that in [18]. Namely, the items in the Index I are ordered according to the access level. The documents
with higher level will be placed in the front, and those with lower level are put in the end. When retrieving, if
the user has lower permission, he only gets the search token with lower grading. However, their construction
cannot guarantee the privacy of the users.
Golle et al. firstly considered the conjunction operation on keywords, and gave two solutions[22]. The
first construction is based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, and the search complexity is
linear in the number of documents stored on the server. The second protocol is based on Bilinear Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) assumption, whose search complexity is linear in the number of keyword fields. The
subsequent work [32] is also linear in the number of documents, but their scheme can support more general
model-boolean query.
Cash et al. were the first to reduce the search complexity of boolean expression on keywords into sub-
linear [13]. Namely, when retrieving the documents that contain keywords w1, . . . , wn, the search complexity
is only linear in the size of the smallest set DB(wi)(1 ≤ i ≤ n), where DB(wi) denotes the documents that
contain keyword wi. However, their protocol only efficiently support such form: w1 ∧ φ(w2, . . . , wn) where φ
is a Boolean formula. Kamara et al. addressed the disjunctive expression w1 ∨w2 ∨ . . .∨wn issue, which can
reduce search complexity of the arbitrary Boolean expression into sub-linear in the worst case[24]. However,
because they used the set theoretic terms, the server can compute all the document set DB(wi)(i = 1, . . . , n).
That is to say, it leaks more information than that in Cash’s scheme [13].
Li et al. proposed two methods to solve the problem of fuzzy search[31], which needed multiple commu-
nications. Boldyreva et al. firstly gave the security definition for fuzzy SSE scheme, whose search complexity
is sub-linear[5]. Wong et al. used asymmetric scalar product preserving encryption technology to solve the
problem of k−nearest neighbor (kNN) computation on encrypted database [40]. Cao et al. put forward the
multi-keyword ranked search algorithm by using kNN idea [11]. Fu et al. designed a central keyword semantic
extension ranked scheme [41].
Kamara et al. proposed a parallel search scheme [25] which needed O(r) parallel time when querying
keyword w, where r denoted the number of documents containing keyword w. Stefanov et al. firstly solved
the problem of forward privacy for dynamic SSE scheme [37] by using hierarchical structure. Bost et al.
pointed out that the scheme [37] was insecure, and gave the improved schemes [8,7]. Van Liesdonk et al.
solved the problem of how to dynamically updating the Index and the documents [39]. The subsequent works
are [26,12,34,42].
Bo¨sch et al. made a whole survey of SSE protocols [6]. In order to break the link among the access pattern,
the search pattern and the size pattern, Cui et al. suggested that in addition to introducing some dummy
data, it should re-randomize and shuffle the physical location of the searched data after executing each query
[17].
The main adversary considered in SSE is honest-but-curious [36,18,25,13,26,12,34]. Kurosawa et al. firstly
used the Message Authentication Code (MAC) technology to resist malicious adversary [27]. Cheng et al.
utilized indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) against the malicious adversary [16], which can also resist the
malicious user. Other works that resist malicious adversary are [8,7,28]. Dai et al. made use of the physically
unclonable function (PUF) to resist the memory attack [19]. Li et al. introduced the coercer into searchable
symmetric encryption [30].
Bitcoin is an emerging electronic digital currency in the peer-to-peer (P2P) network. It was firstly
proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto [33]. The first bucket of Bitcoin was issued in 2009. According to the original
assumption, there is only 21 million Bitcoin which will entirely come into the market in 2040. The generation
of Bitcoin does not depend on the trusted entity, everybody (i.e. miner) in Bitcoin system may issue a certain
amount of Bitcoin as long as he mines a right nonce which is got approval by the majority of nodes.
In order to support the audit, it demands the ledger to be public. Namely, the transactions are publicly
stored on the blockchain. After a transaction was created, it was broadcasted to the blockchain where the
miners will use the proof-of-work mechanism to verify it. Once it is accepted, the transaction will be stored
on a block which is produced on every ten minutes by using the cryptography technology. The Bitcoin can
be seen as a purely decentralized system which requires the majority of nodes in peer-to-peer network to be
honest. Comparing to the previous electronic currency [14,15,10], Bitcoin can support returning change.
There are many works about blockchain in recent years. Ron et al. made a quantitative analysis for the
Bitcoin Transaction [35]. Vitalik et al. firstly introduced smart contract terminology [29] into bitcoin system,
and proposed ethereum [9], which can be seen as a sub-chain of the Bitcoin. Andrychowicz et al. and Bentov
et al. respectively introduced the Bitcoin into multiparty computations to solve the fairness problem [3,2,4]. In
fact, the protocols [3,2,4] can be seen as a smart contract, because it introduces commitment algorithm h(x)
in the out-script of the transaction. Swan put forward several scenarios that the blockchain can be applied to
[38], one of them is Blockchain health. It provides a structure to store the health data on the blockchain such
that it can be analyzed but remain private. The patients who put their own electronic medical record (EMR)
onto the blockchain can obtain a certain amount of healthcoin. In this blockchain system, each researcher,
such as doctors, pharmacies, insurance companies, and so on, can get access to these data as long as they
have the corresponding private keys. However, they did not give an effective search method.
1.2 Our Contribution
Putting the data on an open chain is of significant, because they have potential value in medicine and so
on. Meanwhile, this open chain can be seen as a real cloud storage since each one can contribute some parts
of their own storage space. However, when the data increases, how to perform search quickly is intractable.
Taking the Bitcoin system for example, suppose that Alice wants to read transactions created over a period
of time, she has to read the data from the last block to the first block, which means the search efficiency is
linear into O(|T |), where |T | denotes the number of transactions stored on the blockchain. Therefore, it is
necessary to solve the search problem on the existing blockchains
Moreover, at present, the data usually is stored on a private cloud storage, which may limit the usage of
the data. If a researcher wants to retrieve some data, he needs to ask the user where his data is stored firstly.
Besides, some cloud storages may charge higher service fees. In addition, in the existing SSE schemes, the
server is credible,i.e., it often returns the results to the user, even if the results are incorrect. Though, it can
use message authentication code (MAC) to verify whether the result is right or not, it ends in failure when
the server returns nothing. Therefore, it is necessary to weaken the server’s rights.
To solve the above issues, we combine the blockchain with SSE, and the corresponding contributions are
as follows:
– We store the encrypted data onto the blockchain, which is a decentralized system. In order to support
retrieving, we use the blockchain to construct a new SSE model, which is called as SSE-using-BC. In
order to guarantee the privacy and confidentiality of data, we give its security definition.
– According to the size of the data, we construct two different schemes, which we prove secure under our
security definition.
– We implement our scheme in Linux system, and the experimental results show that our scheme is feasible
and secure.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review some tools and
the terminologies that will be used in our construction. In section 3, we define our SSE-using-BC model
and list the security it should satisfy. In Section 4 we propose our concrete SSE schemes. The analysis of
performance and security are shown in section 5. The last section is conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we mainly review the definition of negligible function, traditional models of SSE and trans-
action happened in the Bitcoin system respectively. Then we list some notations that will be used.
Definition 1. A function f is negligible if for every polynomial p(·) there exists an Integer N such that for
all integer n > N it holds that f(n) < 1
p(n) .
2.1 The model of SSE
It involves three participants in SSE: data owner, server and user. The user and the data owner can be a
same person. As shown in Fig 1: Suppose that the data owner has n documents D1, D2, ..., Dn which need
to be stored on a private cloud. He encrypts these documents into ciphertexts C1, C2, ..., Cn and generates a
corresponding Index I, which will be sent to the cloud. When a user wants to retrieve the documents that
contain keyword w, he computes the search token tw by taking the keyword w and key K as input, which will
be sent to the cloud server. The server finds the document identifiers by combining tw with I, and returns
the corresponding documents Cij to the user. At last, the user decrypts Cij locally.
A SSE scheme is secure if the following properties hold:
– The server cannot learn anything about the plain documents when it only got the ciphertexts.
– Once the server executes search, except the search results, it also cannot learn anything about the plain
documents and the potential keyword.
Fig. 1: SSE Model
2.2 Bitcoin currency system
The Bitcoin system is composed of addresses and transactions between them. The address usually is a hash
value generated by user’s public key. Each user can have a pair of keys (i.e., the private key and the public
key) when he creates a transaction [2]. The private key is used to sign transactions, while the public key
is used to verify whether the signatures σ of these transactions are valid or not. For brevity, let we use
(A.pk,A.sk) to denote the key pair of the user A, and write σ = sigA(m) to be the signature of transaction
m by using the private key sk of A, and verA(m,σ) be the verification by using the public key pk of A.
A transaction in the Bitcoin system can have multiple inputs and outputs, which describe the circulation
of Bitcoin. Let yi be the hash value of previous transaction Tyi, ai be the index of the output of transaction
Tyi. For a transaction, we will use σi to represent its input-script and πi be its output-script, both of them
can be written in Bitcoin scripting language, i.e., the stack based language [3]. Therefore, a transaction can
be expressed as Tx = ((y1, a1, σ1), ..., (yl, al, σl), (v1, π1),..., (vl, πl), t), where (y1, a1, σ1), ..., (yl, al, σl) denote
the inputs, (v1, π1),..., (vl, πl), t) denote the outputs, and vi is the amount of coins. Here, t is a time which is
not a compulsory requirement in a transaction. If a transaction includes time t in the out-script, it means that
this transaction will be valid only after t time. We will write [Tx] = (y1, a1), ..., (yl, al), (v1, π1), ...(vl, πl), t)
to represent the body of Tx.
A transaction is valid if and only if it satisfies that: (1) The time t is reached. (2) The πi([Tx], σi)(1 ≤ i ≤ l)
is valid. (3) The involved previous transactions Ty1 , Ty2 , . . . , Tyl were not redeemed. If a transaction is accepted
by the nodes on the blockchain, it will be included in one block which is produced about every ten minutes.
As shown in figure 2, it is a transaction Tx = (y1, a1, σ1, v, πx, t), where the input script is a signature,
and the output script is a verification algorithm. We call it as a standard transaction.
Fig. 2: transaction Tx
Let x ← A(·) be the output x of an algorithm A, x ← X represent an element x sampled uniformly
from a set X . Let ε = (ε.Enc, ε.Dec) denote a symmetric encryption scheme, where ε.Enc is the encryption
algorithm, and ε.Dec is the corresponding decryption process. The a||b refers to the concatenation of two
string a and b. Let |x| represent the length of x.
3 Our System Model
It is very important to solve the search problem on the blockchain since it is an era of big data nowadays. Take
the Bitcoin system for example, each transaction can be seen as a data. When retrieving some transactions,
it has to start from the last block until the first block, which means the search efficiency is O(n) where n
denotes the number of the data stored on the blockchain. With the increasing number of transactions, this
method has become very awkward. Meanwhile, because traditional data often contain the privacy of users,
we need to encrypt them before uploading them into the blockchain, which further increases the difficulty to
retrieve.
In this section, we firstly build a generic model of SSE-using-BC , then we give its security definition.
3.1 The model of SSE-using-BC
As shown in figure 3, it contains the data owner, the user U ′, the user Q (who is not marked in the Fig.3.)
and miners in the model of SSE-using-BC. The data owner has n documents D = {D1, D2, . . . , Dn} which
need to be uploaded to the blockchain. In order to ensure the privacy and confidentiality of documents, the
data owner uses symmetric encryption algorithm to transform them into ciphertexts C1, C2, . . . , Cn, which
will be uploaded on the blockchain in the form of transaction i(i = 1, . . . , n). After they appear on the
blockchain, each of them will have a corresponding transaction identifier (TXID). Then, the data owner uses
these TXIDs to generate an Index and upload it on the blockchain in the form of transaction Inx. The
data owner broadcasts the identifier TXInx of transaction Inx to others. When user U
′ wants the user Q to
help him retrieve the documents that contain keyword w, he constructs the transaction t which embeds the
information of search token t(w) and Inx. If the user Q wants to get the money dt from transaction t, he
needs to build transaction s which embeds the information of Cij and the hashMAC(Ci1‖ . . . ‖Cin) that the
user U ′ needs. If the transaction s is accepted by the miners, the user U ′ will get the documents Cij . Lastly,
he decrypts them locally. If the transaction s does not appear on the blockchain, the user U ′ will broadcast
transaction p to get his dt dollars back, which is drawn with a dotted line.
Fig. 3: The Model of Searchable Symmetric Encryption using BlockChain
Remark: The user Q, as one of the receivers in the transaction t, is not shown in figure 3, because he is
not a fixed person. That is to say, when retrieving, the user U ′ can ask different person to finish it.
The model of SSE-using-BC is composed of five steps, i.e., Gen,Enc, T rpdr, Search and Dec.
– K ← Gen(1k) : is a probabilistic algorithm that is run by the data owner to set up the scheme. It takes
a security parameter k as input, and outputs secret key K.
– ({Tj}
j=n
j=1 , Inx, TXInx) ← Enc(K,D, {d1$, d2$, . . . , dn$, d$}) : is a probabilistic algorithm that is run
by the data owner to encrypt documents. It takes the secret key K, D = {D1, . . . , Dn} and {d1$, . . . ,
dn$, d$} as input, and output a sequence of transactions T1, . . . , Tn, an index transaction Inx and TXInx
which is an identifier of transaction Inx. The data owner lastly broadcasts TXInx to legitimate users.
– t ← Trpdr(K,w, TXInx, dt$): is a deterministic algorithm that is run by the user U
′. It takes as input
the secret key K, keyword w, identifier TXInx and dt$, and outputs the transaction t.
– (s/p) ← Search(t): is a deterministic algorithm that is run by the user Q and the user U ′. When the
user Q runs this step, it takes the transaction t as input, and outputs transaction s. If this step is run
by user U ′, it takes the transaction t as input, and outputs transaction p.
– {Dij} ← Dec(K, s): is a deterministic algorithm run by the user U
′ to recover the documents. It takes
the secret key K and transaction s as input, and outputs the documents {Dij} that he needs.
A SSE-using-BC scheme is correct if for all K ∈ N, for all K output by Gen(1k), for all D ⊆ 2∆, for all
({Tj}
j=n
j=1 , Inx) output by Enc(K,D, {d1, . . . , dn, d}), for all w ∈ ∆,
Search(Trpdr(K,w, TXInx, dt)) = s
∧
Dec (K, s) = {Dij}, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
3.2 Security Definition
A SSE-using-BC scheme is secure if it meets the following demands.
– The server cannot learn anything about the plain documents when it only gets the ciphertexts;
– When a search is finished, except the search results, the server also cannot learn anything about the plain
documents and the plain keywords that the user queried.
– If the user Q cannot provide the right documents to the user U ′ in the transaction s, he also cannot get
the deposit from the transaction t created by the user U ′.
There are two types of adversary. One is adaptive, the other is non-adaptive. For an adaptive adversary, he
can choose a new keyword according to the previous keywords and search results. A non-adaptive adversary
must choose the search keywords at one time. Here, we only consider the adaptive adversary. We write
{UTXO} to denote the set of unredeemed transactions, and x ← {UTXO} to represent some transactions
are sampled from the set {UTXO} such that the total amount of money in these transactions is x$. We now
present our real/ideal simulation paradigm.
RealΠA (k)
K ← KeyGen(1k)
(D, stA)← A0(1
k)
(d1, . . . , dn, d)← A0(stA, {UTXO})
(T1, . . . , Tn, Inx, TXInx)← Enc(D, K, d1, . . . , dn, d)
(w1, stA)← A1(stA, T1, . . . , Tn, Inx)
dw1 ← A1(stA, {UTXO})
tw1 ← Trpdr(K,w1, TXInx, dw1)
{C11, . . . , C1n} ← A1(stA, T1, . . . , Tn, Inx)
s1 ← Search(tw1 , {C11, . . . , C1n})
for 2 ≤ i ≤ q
(wi, stA)← Ai(stA, T1, . . . , Tn, Inx, tw1 , . . . , twi−1)
dwi ← Ai(stA, {UTXO})
twi ← Trpdr(K,wi, TXInx, dwi)
{Ci1, . . . , Cin} ← Ai(stA, T1, . . . , Tn, Inx)
si ← Search(twi)
let Tr = (tw1 , . . . , twq ), S = (s1, . . . , sq)
output V = (Inx, {T1, . . . , Tn}, T r, S) and stA
Fig. 4: Game RealΠ
A
(k)
Definition 2. Let Π = (Gen,Enc, T rpdr, Search,Dec) be a SSE-using-BC scheme, L denote the leakage
function which can be parameterized by access pattern, search pattern and size pattern defined in [18], k be the
security parameter, A = (A0,A1, ...,Aq) be an adversary where q ∈ N, and S = (S0,S1, ...,Sq) be a simulator.
Considering the games RealΠ
A
(k) and IdealΠ
A,S(k) shown in the figure 4 and 5.
We say a SSE-using-BC scheme is adaptively semantically secure if for all polynomial size adversaries A =
(A0,A1, ...,Aq) where q = poly(k), there exists a non-uniform polynomial size simulator S = (S0,S1, ...,Sq),
such that for all polynomial size D,
|Pr[D(V, stA) = 1 : (V, stA)← Real
Π
A
(k)]− Pr[D(V, stA) = 1 : (V, stA)← Ideal
Π
A,S(k)]| ≤ neg(k)
where the probabilities are taken over the coins of Gen, Enc, Trpdr and Search processes.
4 The detailed scheme
If users upload their documents on the blockchain, any researcher can get access to them conveniently. In order
to make the blockchain growing normally, it usually requires that the size of each block is fixed. However, the
scale of data is different, so some data cannot be stored on the blockchain directly. According to this issue,
we consider two situations.
IdealΠA,S(k)
(D, stA)← A0(1
k)
D = (d1, . . . , dn, d)← A0(stA, {UTXO})
(T1, . . . , Tn, Inx, TXInx, stS)← S0(L(D),D)
(w1, stA)← A1(stA, {T1, . . . , Tn}, Inx)
dw1 ← A1(stA, {UTXO})
(tw1 , stS)← S1(stS , L(D, w1, TXInx), dw1)
({C11, . . . , C1n}, stA)← A1(stA, T1, . . . , Tn, Inx)
(s1, stS)← S1(stS , tw1 , {C11, . . . , C1n})
for 2 ≤ i ≤ q
(wi, stA)← Ai(stA, {T1, . . . , Tn}, Inx, tw1 , . . . , twi−1)
dwi ← Ai(stA, {UTXO})
(twi , stS)← Si(stS , L(D, w1, . . . , wi, TXInx), dwi)
({Ci1, . . . , Cin}, stA)← Ai(stA, T1, . . . , Tn, Inx)
(si, stS)← Si(stS , twi)
let Tr = (tw1 , . . . , twq ), S = (s1, . . . , sq)
output V = (Inx, {T1, . . . , Tn}, T r, S) and stA
Fig. 5: Game IdealΠ
A,S(k)
4.1 A SSE-using-BC scheme for the Lightweight Data
In this case, there are four participants: Data owner, user U ′, user Q and miners. The data owner will upload
n (small integer) lightweight documents onto the blockchain. The miners will collect these documents and
store them on the blockchain. The user U ′ wants to retrieve some documents that he is interested in. The
user Q will return the documents to the user U ′. Here, the data owner and user U ′ can be same, if they are
two different person, they will share the secret key.
Let F1, F2, F3 be three pseudorandom functions, where F1 : {0, 1}
k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, F2 : {0, 1}
k ×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, F3 : {0, 1}
k×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, ε = (ε.Enc, ε.Dec) be an IND−PCPA secure symmetric
encryption scheme, ǫ = (ǫ.Enc, ǫ.Dec) be a deterministic symmetric encryption algorithm and H be a hash
function of the merkle-Damg˚ard type which maps l · p−th strings to p−th strings, where p and l are fixed
integers. Suppose each transaction identifier of length p can be computed by the transaction itself.
The concrete construction is composed of five steps.
– Gen: It takes the security parameter k as input, and outputs a secret key array K = (K1,K2), where
Ki ← {0, 1}
k(1 ≤ i ≤ 2).
– Enc: Firstly, the data owner will use the private keyK1 to transform the documents D = {D1, D2, . . . , Dn}
into C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}:
Ci = ε.Enc(K1, Di)(1 ≤ i ≤ n),
To store the ciphertext Ci(1 ≤ i ≤ n), he finds n unredeemed transactions TXD0i(i = 1, . . . , n) of value
di$ whose receiver is data owner, and builds the following transactions TXDi(i = 1, . . . , n):
• He computes the body of transaction TXDi by using the TXD0i as input.
• He embeds Ci(1 ≤ i ≤ n) into the out-script of transaction TXDi. After signing it, he broadcasts it
to the blockchain.
• The miners will collect these transactions. If the transaction TXDi(i = 1, . . . , n) appears on the
ledger, the data owner records its corresponding transaction identifier TXIDDi.
Let W = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} denote a dictionary composed of keywords that appear in the D, where m
means the number of keywords. For each keyword wi(1 ≤ i ≤ m), he selects the set DB(wi) that is
initialized to be empty. If the document Dij contains keyword wi, he then puts TXIDDij into DB(wi).
Suppose ∆i represents the number of elements in DB(wi), and let ∆ = max
1≤i≤m
{∆i}. If ∆i < ∆, the data
owner pads the remaining ∆−∆i elements with 0
p, such that the size of DB(wi) is equal to ∆.
Now, the data generates the following transaction which can be seen the documents’ Index.
• For each keyword wi ∈ W , he firstly computes:
twi = F1(K2, wi), lwi = F2(K2, wi),
ewi = ǫ.Enc(lwi , DB(wi)), kwi = F3(K2, wi),
hwi = H(kwi , Ci1‖ . . . ‖Cin).
He then puts (twi , ewi , hwi) into the array I in the order of dictionary.
• The data owner finds unredeem transaction TX0 of value d0$, whose receiver is himself.
• He uses the transaction transaction TX0 to compute the body of transaction Inx. He then embeds
I in the out-script of Inx and signs it. Next, he broadcasts it on the blockchain.
• If the transaction Inx appears on the blockchain, he broadcasts its identifier TXInx to others.
– Trpdr: Let φ(, ) be a function that composed of decryption algorithm and verification algorithm. when
inputting x, y, this function firstly uses y to locate the corresponding transaction q, and uses x to decrypt
the information embedded in q. Suppose the result is α, β. It then takes the α, β, x as input and verifies
if β
?
= H(x, α). If it holds, this function outputs α, 1.
Now, the user U ′ wants to find the segment of documents that contain keyword w. As shown in figure 6,
he will create the transaction ask, the concrete process is as follows:
• Appoint a person to search, suppose it is the user Q.
• Find an unredeemed transaction Tq of value dt$, whose receiver is the user U
′. He then uses Tq to
compute the body of ask.
• Compute tw = F1(K2, w), lw = F2(K2, w) and kw = F3(K2, w).
• Both U ′ and Q use transaction ask to compute the body of transaction Fuse with time lock set to
some time t in the future. Q signs the transaction Fuse and sends it to U ′. The user U ′ puts his
signature on it.
• The user U ′ puts ((tw, lw, kw), TXInx) into the out-script of ask.
• After signing the transaction ask, he broadcasts it.
• If the transaction ask does not appear on the blockchain until time t − maxU ′ , where maxU ′ is
the maximal possible delay of including it in the blockchain, the user U ′ immediately redeems the
transaction Tq by using his private key and quits the protocol.
Fig. 6: get the documents that contain keyword w
– Search: If the user Q wants to get the money from the transaction ask, he must compute the result by
running the function φ(, ) and creates the transaction return.
• Compute the body of return transaction by using ask transaction as input.
• Run the function φ((tw , lw, kw), TXInx). Namely, he firstly uses TXInx to read the information I
embedded in the transaction Inx. Then, he finds (ew, hw) from I by using tw. Next, the user Q
decrypts ew: DB(w) = ǫ.Dec(lw, ew). Suppose DB(w) = {TXIDDl1 , TXIDDl2 , . . . , TXIDDln},
where TXIDDlj (j = 1, . . . , n) is the identifier of transaction TXDlj (j = 1, . . . , n). The user Q reads
the document ciphertext Clj from transaction TXDlj .
• Embed the ({Clj}, hw) into the out-script of transaction return.
• Broadcast transaction return to the blockchain with his signature on it.
– Dec: If the transaction return appears on the blockchain, the user Q can get the {Clj} from it. Then he
uses private key to compute Dlj = ε.Dec(K1, Clj ) (1 ≤ j ≤ n). If within time t the transaction return
does not appear on the blockchain, the user Q broadcasts transaction Fuse and get his money back.
4.2 A SSE-using-BC scheme for the Big Data
It indirectly indicates that the size of the data and the index is not large in the above case. However, there
always exists big data in reality, which will be rejected in the blockchain system since its size is larger than
the maximum value of the transaction that the system allows to be. Therefore, we needs to process the data
before storing them on the blockchain. In this section, we give a feasible scheme to solve this issue.
Before the scheme beginning, the user will choose the following functions. Let F1, F2, F3 be three pseu-
dorandom functions, where F1 : {0, 1}
k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, F2 : {0, 1}
k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, F3 : {0, 1}
k ×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, ε = (ε.Enc, ε.Dec) be an IND − PCPA secure symmetric encryption scheme, ǫ =
(ǫ.Enc, ǫ.Dec) be a deterministic symmetric encryption algorithm and H be a keyed hash function H :
{0, 1}k×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k. Suppose the length of the transaction cannot exceed ι, and the length of identifier
of the transaction is p.
The concrete scheme is composed of five steps which is listed as follows.
– Gen: It takes the security parameter k as input, and outputs a secret key array K = (K1,K2), where
Ki ← {0, 1}
k(1 ≤ i ≤ 2).
– Enc: Firstly, the data owner will use the private keyK1 to transform the documents D = {D1, D2, . . . , Dn}
into C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}:
Ci = ε.Enc(K1, Di)(1 ≤ i ≤ n).
• If |Ci| > ι, the data owner will divide Ci into s blocks C˜i1, C˜i2, . . . , C˜is, such that |C˜ij |+ p ≤ ι, ∀j ∈
{1, . . . , s}, where s = ⌈ |Ci|
ι−p⌉. To store Ci, he finds s unredeemed transactions TXD˜0ik(k = 1, . . . , s) of
value dik$, whose receiver is the data owner. He then builds transactions TXD˜ik(k = 1, . . . , s) shown
as follows:
∗ When k = 1:
· Compute the body of transaction TXD˜i1 by using the TXD˜0i1 as input.
· Embed C˜i1‖0
p into the out-script of transaction TXD˜i1 . After singing it, he broadcasts it to
the blockchain.
· If the TXD˜i1 appears on the blockchain, he records its identifier TXIDD˜i1.
∗ For 2 ≤ k ≤ s:
· Compute the body of transaction TXD˜ik by using the TXD˜0ik as input.
· Embed C˜ik‖TXIDD˜i(k−1) into the out-script of transaction TXD˜ik . After singing it, he broad-
casts it to the blockchain.
· If the transaction TXD˜ik appears on the ledger, he records its corresponding transaction
identifier TXIDD˜ik .
• If |Ci| ≤ ι(1 ≤ i ≤ n), he then finds an unredeemed transaction TXD0i of value di$, whose receiver
is data owner. He next builds the following transaction TXDi :
∗ Computes the body of transaction TXDi by using the TXD0i as input.
∗ Embeds Ci into the out-script of transaction TXDi. After signing it, he broadcasts it to the nodes.
∗ The miners will collect it. If the transaction TXDi appears on the ledger, he records its corre-
sponding transaction identifier TXIDDi.
Let W = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} denote the dictionary composed of keywords that appear in the D, where m
is the number of keywords. For each keyword wi(1 ≤ i ≤ m), he selects the set DB(wi) that is initialized
to be empty.
• If wi ∈ Dij
∧
|Cij | > ι, he puts TXIDD˜ij s
into the set DB(wi).
• If wi ∈ Dij
∧
|Cij | ≤ ι, he puts TXIDDij into the set DB(wi).
Suppose ∆i represents the number of elements in DB(wi), let ∆ = max
1≤i≤m
{∆i}. If ∆i < ∆, the data
owner pads 0p for the remaining ∆−∆i elements in DB(wi).
Now, the data owner generates the following transaction for each keyword wi ∈ W . Namely, he firstly
computes:
twi = F1(K2, wi), lwi = F2(K2, wi),
ewi = ǫ.Enc(lwi , DB(wi)), kwi = F3(K2, wi),
hwi = H(kwi , Ci1‖ . . . ‖Cin).
• In order to create transaction TXIw1 for keyword w1, the data owner finds an unredeem transaction
TXIw10 of value dw10$, whose receiver is himself.
• He uses the transaction transaction TXIw10 to compute the body of transaction TXIw1. He then
computes
K11 = F2(K2, 0
p), r1 = ǫ.Enc(K11, tw1‖ew1‖hw1‖0
p),
and embeds r1 in the out-script of TXIw1 and signs it. At last, he broadcasts it on the blockchain.
• If the transaction TXIw1 appears on the blockchain, he records its identifier TIw1 , which can be seen
as a pointer to TXIw1.
• If transaction TXIw1 does not appear on the blockchain, the data owner can redeem transaction
TXIw10 quickly and quits the protocol.
For wj(2 ≤ j ≤ m), the data owner creates transaction TXIwj which is shown as follows:
• The data owner finds an unredeem transaction TXIj0 of value dj0$, whose receiver is himself.
• He uses the transaction transaction TXIj0 to compute the body of transaction TXIwj . He computes
K11 = F2(K2, 0
p), rj = ǫ.Enc(K11, twj‖ewj‖hwj‖TIwj−1),
then embeds rj in the out-script of TXIwj and signs it. At last, he broadcasts it on the blockchain.
• If the transaction TXIwj appears on the blockchain, he records its identifier TIwj , which can be seen
as a pointer to TXIwj .
• If transaction TXIwj does not appear on the blockchain, the data owner can redeem transaction
TXIj0 quickly and quits the protocol.
At last, the data owner broadcasts TIwm to others who have the permission of search.
– Trpdr: Let φ(·, ·) be a function that composed of decryption algorithm and verification algorithm. when
inputting x, y, this function firstly uses y to locate the corresponding transaction q, and uses x to decrypt
the information embedded in q. Suppose the result is α, β. It then takes α, β, x as input and verifies if
β
?
= H(x, α). If it holds, this function outputs α, 1.
Now, the user U ′ wants to find the segment of documents that contain keyword w. As shown in figure 7,
he will create the transaction ask, the concrete process is as follows:
• Appoint a person to search, suppose it is the user Q.
• Find an unredeemed transaction Tq of value dt$, whose receiver is the user U
′. He then uses Tq to
compute the body of ask.
• Compute tw = F1(K2, w), lw = F2(K2, w), K11 = F2(K2, 0
p) and kw = F3(K2, w).
• Both U ′ and Q use transaction ask to compute the body of Fuse transaction with time lock set to
some time t in the future. Q sends Fuse to U ′ with his signature on it. Then, the user U ′ can put
his signature on it.
• The user U ′ embeds ((tw, lw, kw), K11, T Iwm) into the out-script of ask.
• After signing the transaction ask, he broadcasts it.
• If the transaction ask does not appear on the blockchain until time t − maxU ′ , where maxU ′ is
the maximal possible delay of including it in the blockchain, the user U ′ immediately redeems the
transaction Tq by using his private key and quits the protocol.
– Search: As shown in figure 7, if the user Q wants to claim the money from the transaction ask, he must
do:
• Compute the body of transaction return transaction by using transaction ask as input.
• Run the function φ(tw, lw, kw,K11, T Iwm). Firstly, he uses TIwm to read the information rm embedded
in the transaction TXIwm , and computes twm‖ewm‖hwm‖TIwm−1 = ǫ.Dec(K11, rm).
Fig. 7: return the documents that contain keyword w
∗ If twm = tw, he continues to do DBwm = ǫ.Dec(lwm , ewm). Suppose DBwm = {TXIDDm1 ,
. . . , TXIDDm∆}. He reads ciphertext Ci by using TXIDDmi (1 ≤ i ≤ ∆):
· If the information embedded in the transaction TXDmi is Cmi , he records this value.
· If the information embedded in the transaction TXDmi is C˜mis‖ TXIDD˜mi(s−1)
, he firstly
records C˜mis, and continues to use the transaction identifier TXIDD˜mij
to read the informa-
tion C˜mij(j = s− 1, . . . , 1) embedded in the transaction TXD˜mij
(j = s− 1, . . . , 1). Then, he
computes Cmi = C˜mi1‖ . . . ‖C˜mis.
∗ If twm 6= tw, he uses transaction identifier TIwm−j to read information rm−j(j = 1, . . . ,m − 1)
embedded in the transaction TXIwm−j(j = 1, . . . ,m− 1) until it stops. That is to say, he does:
· Decrypt twm−j‖ewm−j‖hwm−j‖TIwm−j−1 = ǫ.Enc(K11, rm−j),
· Verify twm−j
?
= tw. If it holds, he decrypts DBwm−j and gets {Cl1, . . . , Cln} by using the
above method. If it does not hold, he continues to read the information rm−j−1 embedded in
the transaction TXIwm−j−1 .
• Embed the ({Cl1 , . . . , Cln}, hw) into the out-script of transaction return.
• Sign the transaction return and broadcast it.
– Dec: If the transaction return appears on the blockchain, the user Q can get the {Clj} from it. Then he
uses private key to compute Dlj = ε.Dec(K1, Clj ) (1 ≤ j ≤ n). If within time t the transaction return
does not appear on the blockchain, the user Q broadcasts transaction Fuse and get his money back.
5 Security and Performance Analysis
Because the search process of the second scheme shown in section 4.2 is similar to that in section 4.1 and
it can run on the current Bitcoin test chain, therefore, in this section, we only give the performance and
security analyses for the second scheme.
5.1 Performance
We evaluate the performance of our second scheme on the computer with Intel Core E3− 1241V 3 processor,
32GB memory. Our code was complied without any optimization in Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The version number
of Bitcoin that we use is 130200. In this system, the protocol version number is 70015, and the version of
wallet is 130000. Each block is produced about 39ms.
It is well known that it only supports 80 bytes in the OP RETURN script of a transaction, if we directly put
ri = ǫ.Enc(K11, twi‖ewi‖hwi‖TIwi−1) into the out-script, it will result in the transaction is error. Therefore, in
order to make the transaction operate normally, we need to divide (twi‖ewi‖hwi‖TIwi−1) into three parts and
put them into three transactions without encryption. Namely, for keyword w1, the first part (hw1‖0
p) will be
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Fig. 8: The time of index construction and search
embedded into transaction Tw11. After transaction Tw11 appearing on the blockchain, we put ew1 concatenated
with the transaction identifier TXw11 of Tw11 into the second transaction Tw12. If the transaction Tw12 appears
on the blockchain, we put tw1 concatenated with the transaction identifier TXw12 of Tw12 into the following
transaction Tw13. For keyword wi(2 ≤ i ≤ m), we put (hwi‖TXw13) into the out-script of transaction Twi1,
where TXw13 denotes the transaction identifier of Tw13. After transaction Twi1 appearing on the blockchain,
the ewi concatenated with the transaction identifier TXwi1 of Twi1 is put into the second transaction Twi2.
If the transaction Twi2 appears on the blockchain, we put twi concatenated with the transaction identifier
TXwi2 of Twi2 into the following transaction Twi3. Here, the reason we do not encrypt them is that we want
to meet the requirement of Bitcoin test chain, and prove our scheme is feasible. In fact, in order to meet the
security requirement, we can modify the parameters to make the transaction support more bytes.
The parameters related to the time of index construction are the number of documents and keywords.
As shown in Fig.8, we can see that the time of index construction is linear into the number of pair (w, id),
where w denotes the keyword and id denotes a document’s identifier. Because these transactions connect one
by one, when search, we need to read from the last transaction until tw˜ = tw happening. As shown in Fig.9,
it shows that the search time is sub-linear in the number of pair (w, id) when we find the documents that
only contain keyword w on different scales of data.
5.2 Security Analysis
Though the schemes shown in the section 4 are different, their ideas are similar. Therefore, their security
proof is similar. In this section, we only give the security proof for the first scheme in the section 4.1, the
proof for the second scheme can be derived similarly.
Theorem 1. If F1, F2, F3 are pseudorandom functions, H is a collision resistant hash function, and ε =
(Enc,Dec) is PCPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme, then the scheme we present in section 4.1 is
adaptively IND-CKA2 secure.
Proof. We need to construct a PPT simulator S = {S0,S1, ...,Sq} and an adversary A = {A0,A1, ..., Aq}
to make the output of IdealΠ
A,S(k) and Real
Π
A
(k) be computationally indistinguishable.
Suppose that the simulator S is given the trace of a history L = (|T1|, . . . , |Tn|, |Inx|, τ(TXw)) where
τ(TXw) denotes the search pattern and the access pattern about keyword w, then he can generate (Inx
∗, T ∗1 ,
. . . , T ∗n , T r, S) and claim transaction ask as follows:
– Simulating T ∗1 , . . . , T
∗
n .
Because the encryption algorithm ε = (Enc,Dec) is PCPA-secure, it guarantees the C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
n in
IdealΠ
A,S(k) game are computationally indistinguishable from the C1, . . . , Cn in Real
Π
A
(k) game. There-
fore, when the simulator S embeds C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
n into transactions T
∗
1 , . . . , T
∗
n , they are computationally
indistinguishable from the transactions T1, . . . , Tn that generated in the Real
Π
A
(k) game.
– Simulating Inx∗.
If q = 0, S sets t∗w ← {0, 1}
k, e∗w ← {0, 1}
k,h∗w ← {0, 1}
k. Therefore, the tw, ew, hw generated in the step
Enc in the section 4.1 are computationally indistinguishable from t∗w, e
∗
w, h
∗
w.
When q ≥ 1, S selects l∗wq ← {0, 1}
k and k∗wq ← {0, 1}
k, then does e∗wq = ǫ.Enc(l
∗
wq
, DB∗(wq)), h
∗
wq
=
H(k∗wq , C
∗
wq1‖ . . . ‖C
∗
wqn
). Because F2, F3 are pseudorandom functions, the (e
∗
wq
, h∗wq ) is computationally
indistinguishable from (ewq , hwq ) generated in step Enc. Because F1 is a pseudorandom function, the
twq generated in step Enc is computationally indistinguishable from t
∗
wq
that S chooses at random from
{0, 1}k.
Therefore, Inx∗ is computationally indistinguishable from Inx.
– Simulating Tr. In the transaction Tr∗, it embeds t∗w and TXinx. Because TXinx is broadcasted to each
other, A can get it easily. Here we only consider t∗w is indistinguishable from tw. It uses the pseudorandom
function F1 to generate tw for keyword w in the step Trpdr in the section 4.1, and tw is indistinguishable
from t∗w ← {0, 1}
k that S chooses at random. Therefore, Tr∗ is computationally indistinguishable from
Tr.
– Claiming the transaction ask by using transaction S.
When q = 0, if A wants to get the money from the transaction S∗. S returns ({Ci1, . . . , Cin}, hw) to A,
where Cij ← {0, 1}
k(j = 1, . . . , n) and hw ← {0, 1}
k. When q ≥ 1, S firstly returns ({Cwq1, . . . , Cwqn})
to A, where Cwqj(j = 1, . . . , n) is the history of access pattern about keyword wq. S sets k
∗
wq
← {0, 1}k
and computes h∗wq = H(k
∗
wq
, Cwq1‖ . . . ‖Cwqn) which will be sent to A. Because F3 is a pseudorandom
function, therefore the transaction S that the A creates cannot claim the money from transaction ask.
6 Conclusion
At present, the data on the blockchain is increasing, therefore, the search problem becomes more and more
serious. Besides, the data on the existing blockchain does not contain anything about the privacy of users,
which limits the usage of blockchain. In this paper, we firstly put users’ data on the blockchain in the form
of encryption. In order to support effective search, we propose two solution with |O(D(w)| complexity, where
|D(w)| denotes the number of documents that contain keyword w.
Our scheme indirectly solves the search problem on the current blockchains. Moreover, our scheme is
very suitable for the medical enterprises, social network and so on. However, the data on these platforms
sometimes need to be modified, it means that the index also need be updated. Because the transaction cannot
be reversed on the blockchain, which results in the index cannot be updated. Therefore, our scheme is not
available for the dynamic data.
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